This paper discusses arguments for and against introducing competition into the accounting standard-setting process in the U.S. by allowing individual corporations to issue financial reports prepared in accordance with either FASB or IASB rules. The paper examines several arguments supporting the status quo, including (1) the FASB's experience and world leadership in making accounting rules, (2) the increased risk of a "race to the bottom" under regulatory competition, (3) the inability of most users of financial reports to understand the complex technical issues underlying accounting standards, (4) the possibility that IASB's standards will be diluted to gain international acceptance, allowing additional opportunities for earnings management, (5) the risks of the IASB being deadlocked or captured by interests hostile to business, (6) the costs of experimentation in standard-setting, and (7) economies from network externalities. Arguments examined on the other side include how competition will (1) help meet the needs of globalized businesses, (2) increase the likelihood that the accounting standards will be efficient, (3) help protect standard-setters from undue pressure from interest groups, (4) allow different standards to develop for different corporate clienteles, (5) allow corporations to send more informative signals by their choice of accounting standards, (6) protect corporations against capture of regulatory body by narrow interests, and (7) not affect network externalities at national or global scales.
tradition; it has a worldwide reputation for visionary leadership in setting standards. Why change things now?
The World Has Changed

C1:
I agree with much of what you said. The FASB's pronouncements are often used as a model by many other countries, as well as by the IASB itself. No other standard-setting body in the world comes even close to matching the FASB's achievements. An argument for change now need not be read as a criticism of the FASB's past accomplishments and leadership.
However, we must also look at the present and into the future.
The economic map of the world has changed over the past quarter century, and it continues to change. The U.S. economy, its capital markets, and U.S.-based multinational corporations are still the largest in the world. But, even though the U.S. economy continues to grow, faster growth in other parts of the world elevates the relative importance of other economies, their capital markets, and corporations based outside the U.S. In addition, capital flows more freely across national boundaries now than in the past. As a result, an increasing proportion of the holders of securities reside outside the legal jurisdiction in which the issuers of the securities reside, whether governments or private organizations or individuals. For example, a corporation chartered in the state of Delaware has shareholders, plants, employees, customers and vendors scattered all over the globe, diluting the meaning and relevance of its national identity.
If we assume that certain standards are useful for promoting commerce, cross-boundary commerce requires cross-boundary standards. This is what the IASB is trying to do in the field of accounting, for the U.S. and for the world economy. There are parallels between the IASB's efforts and the federal laws that regulate interstate commerce and securities in the U.S. Over a "Debate," 5/24/01 century ago, the state of New York dominated the U.S. economy, and the laws and practices of that state influenced business conventions throughout the country. 1 As the economies of the other parts of the U.S. developed, the national role of the state of New York diminished. Given the continuing development of the world economy, the FASB may not be able to continue its predominant role in determining national and international accounting standards.
I could make many arguments why it is desirable to allow the IASB to take the lead in formulating accounting standards in the U.S. Instead, I propose a more conservative course of allowing both the FASB and IASB standards to operate in the U.S. for five to ten years. With the insights generated by this experience, we could then decide whether to depend on either the FASB's or the IASB's standards, or to allow the standards developed by both to continue to operate in parallel.
Competition May Induce a Race to the Bottom
M2: Let us consider the suggestion that the U.S. allow each reporting organization to choose whether it wishes to publish its financial reports according to the FASB's or IASB's accounting standards. Presumably, the firms will not be allowed to pick and choose among individual standards, and the financial reports will be clearly labeled to inform the reader of the set of standards they conform to. However, I doubt if the average reader of financial reports has the accounting and financial expertise to distinguish between the information provided by financial reports prepared under the two sets of standards. How many people understand the meaning and implication of the UL (Underwriters Laboratories) stamp at the bottom of their toaster? And using a toaster is easier than reading financial statements. I fear that allowing two sets of standards will induce a "race to the bottom," and erase the hard-won gains of financial reporting in the U.S. over the past half-century.
C2:
What do you mean by a "race to the bottom?" M3: A "race to the bottom" is a degradation of the quality and/or quantity of standards resulting from competition between standard-setting bodies. Moreover, the FASB pays for many of its operating costs through sale of publications, and through contributions from various constituents, including firms subject to FASB's rules.
Given freedom to choose between alternative sets of standards, firms are likely to buy the publications of, and make contributions to, the body whose standards they adopt. In addition to this link between the adoption of standards and the revenues of the standard-setting bodies, there is also the question of the respect and authority that derives from having many firms comply with a given body's standards. In their attempt to attract a larger following, and knowing that the firms prefer the least demanding standards, the standard-setting bodies will tend to issue standards that pander to the reporting firms. What is worse, you won't have to wait for arrival of actual competition among standard setters before observing a reduction in the quality of accounting standards; even the anticipation of competition will lower the quality of standards. The argument that competition is good because it pushes organizations to be more responsive to their constituents can be taken only so far. In some instances, markets break down, and the consequences of competition can be worse than monopoly. If air pollution standards were set locally by individual municipalities, each might seek to attract industry by lowering its own standards with the expectation that a significant part of the cost of pollution will be borne by the residents of neighboring towns. In order to avoid this "race to the bottom," these standards are set by the federal government at the national level.
In any case, as I mentioned earlier, the process for setting accounting standards in the U.S. already has many desirable attributes: it is transparent and subject to detailed public 4 As an example of analytical model of managers' demand for earnings management, see Dye [1988] . 5 Just as the threat of competition from firms not presently in a market can discipline the prices set by firms already in the market. See, e.g., Baumol, Panzar, and Willig [1982] . 6 See Parfet (2000, p. 484). scrutiny. Moreover, it is highly responsive to its constituents, which include both the investing public and the business community. Making the process more responsive, by allowing competition between standard-setting bodies, is only likely to create inappropriate pressure for lowering standards.
Competition Need Not be Equated to "Race to the Bottom"
C4:
After hearing your argument, I agree that unbridled market competition is not a perfect solution to the problem of standard-setting. We should look at the restraints that exist in the system to keep the potentially undesirable consequences of free competition under control. We also need to review the benefits of a limited amount of competition in this field.
If we allow competition in the creation of accounting standards, we will not do so in a vacuum. Acceptance of IASB standards in other countries is subject to the approval of local authorities. So is the approval of any changes in GAAP in the U.S. Even today in the U.S., the SEC reviews all proposals and pronouncements of the FASB before deciding to support them.
We will certainly continue this process if we allow IASB standards to compete with those of the FASB. If the SEC judges that either body is trying to "race the other to the bottom," it can withdraw its support and undermine the credibility of the offending standard-setter. This threat will restrain the tendency of standards to "race to the bottom."
Moreover, all markets do not necessarily "race to the bottom. M5: Although some of the details of your argument make sense to me, I want to return to the analogy between competition among accounting standard-setters and competition among jurisdictions in setting pollution standards mentioned previously. In both cases, the problem is the existence of "externalities," or "spillover" costs or benefits arising when one party's actions result in uncompensated gains or losses to other parties. Pollution creates an externality except demand for their services when setting the height of the bar for admission. Setting the bar low enhances neither their reputations nor the demand for their services. 
C5:
It is interesting that you present the example of why there are national, and not municipal, standards for air pollution. Just as air travels from one municipal jurisdiction to another --making air quality difficult to control satisfactorily by local standards --capital also travels across national boundaries, making it difficult to control by national standards. This argument lies at the heart of the case for giving the IASB a fair trial in the U.S.
Achieving the right balance in air pollution controls is not a trivial problem. But, neither is choosing the right level of accounting standards. The most difficult problem in developing accounting standards, it seems to me, entails determining the right balance between "excessive" and "insufficient" standardization. The value of financial reporting is diminished at either extreme. Insufficient standards make it difficult for financial statement readers to identify the principles firms applied in constructing the statements. Excessive or inordinately narrow standards may prevent firms from selecting a reporting procedure that accurately conveys the substance of their economic situation.
Competition can help the economy "zero in" on the right level of accounting standards.
It is difficult to conduct a social cost-benefit analysis of proposals for new standards, or for eliminating existing ones. Estimates of the economic consequences of such proposals are notoriously inaccurate. Asking firms or others to furnish their own estimates of the economic consequences of an accounting proposal runs into two problems. First, only those people or firms whose individual gains or losses are sufficiently large respond to such solicitations, resulting in a selection bias. Second, when they do respond, firms and other interested parties have obvious incentives to exaggerate their estimates in the hope of influencing the adopted policy.
Because accurate social cost-benefit analyses are difficult to conduct, accounting rules actually implemented may be inappropriate. Moreover, the difficulties attending the assessment of standards makes standard-setters susceptible to the so-called Law of the Instrument 11 ; that is, standard-setters may recommend the promulgation of more and more standards even when better alternatives exist. The resulting standards do not achieve the best social outcomes. This may account for the explosive growth of standards during the years since the creation of the FASB.
Competition among standard-setting organizations can eliminate some of these problems and increase the efficiency of standards. Reactions to competing standards furnish each standard-setting organization with real feedback from their constituents. Instead of posturing as they often do at present, firms will "vote with their feet" in adopting or rejecting standards.
12
Competing standard-setting organizations are likely to be more responsive to demands for better goes by the name "the tragedy of the commons." See, e.g., Stiglitz, [1997] . 11 "I call it the law of the instrument, and it may be formulated as follows: Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding." Kaplan [1964, p. 28] . 12 See Tiebout [1956] for the effects of competition between jurisdictions on the efficiency of the provision of local standards than is a monolithic standard-setter. If one set of standards is deficient relative to another, competition will eliminate the former. Both insufficient and excessive standard-setting will be curtailed as a consequence.
Survival of the Fittest and Voting by Feet
M6: Your argument seems to be a variation on the Darwinian "survival of the fittest" line of reasoning. Following this logic, one can make a case for not having any standards at all. After all, standards are a form of social norm or custom, and customs tend to evolve to efficient forms over time. This is the basic premise of the law and economics movement championed by Posner (1992) and others: the common law will eventually lead to socially efficient rules of behavior over time. Since the law does not face competition from other laws in a society, but is presumed to become efficient eventually, why shouldn't we expect accounting standards to become efficient over time also, with or without competition?
C6: I agree that, like all social norms, accounting standards may converge to efficient rules over time with or without competition. But, also like social norms, the evolution of accounting standards toward efficiency is neither rapid nor certain. Under rapid and continual change, accounting standards can permanently lag behind current business conditions, causing resources to be misallocated. Thus, there is a demand for organizations that develop financial reporting standards. If we must have some formal standard-setting body, it's sensible not to allow any single body to have monopoly control of this process. A single source of accounting standards doesn't allow firms to "vote with their feet," and hence increases the chance of errors being perpetuated over the long term.
People May Not Know What is Good For Them
M7: This "voting by their feet" argument assumes that people who make these public goods. Also see Tjiong [2000] for some counter arguments. believe firms will ultimately understand that it was in their own best interest to recognize these expenses. The FASB has little chance of reaching that stage in such a politically charged issue.
In any case, that is the reason why we need panels of experts like the FASB and IASB rather than referendums to set accounting standards.
C7:
Your concern about the receptivity of business to new accounting standards such as those Moreover, international accounting standards necessarily gloss over the variations in the functioning of national capital markets. They tend to be based on one of two strategies. One strategy is to base the international standards on standards already in force someplace. If sufficient support is not forthcoming for any existing standard, a new standard is drafted. The new standard needs to gain substantial support from countries with diverse accounting practices and institutions. Often, the outcome of this process is a "minimum common denominator standard," which is just another way of phrasing "the race to the bottom" we discussed earlier.
Unless the standards chosen are modeled after the practices of a country with a strong bias in favor of equal access to information, the outcome will be a step backward for investors. Since the U.S. is the leader in standard-setting, forcing U.S. standard setters to compromise their principles for the sake of international harmonization will only have the effect of watering down U.S.
GAAP. This is not the best outcome for participants in the U.S. securities markets.
C8:
We both agree that business environments vary across countries. Let us also agree that in an ideal world it might be best to develop a unique set of ideal accounting standards for each environment. But even within a legal jurisdiction, organizations of different sizes operate in different industries and in regions with different business environments. In fact one could make a good argument that there is less difference between the business environments of Exxon and British Petroleum than between Exxon and Paradise Inc., a small Florida confectioner traded on NASDAQ. So the problem you rightly point to is not unique to international accounting standard-setting.
Fortunately, the resolution on the table leads to a reasonable solution to the problem.
Under a competitive standard-setting system, the harmonization of reporting standards across the globe can proceed at a voluntary pace determined by local conditions. Firms with local clientele and little or no international exposure may find comfort in conforming to locally optimized standards written by their domestic standard-setting body, such as the FASB in the U.S. Other firms with international clienteles will choose to conform to international standards if they believe they are better off by doing so. This two-tiered system allows more freedom of choice to firms in all countries. Instead of suppressing it, such an approach will actually promote the legitimization of local standard-setting bodies. Within the U.S., for example, various stock exchanges compete by setting their own standards for listing firms. This competition creates a multi-tiered market that is healthy for the securities industry. It led to an equilibrium in which the New York Stock Exchange coexists with NASDAQ, several regional exchanges, and even the Vancouver Stock Exchange with its reputation for trading highly speculative securities.
Introducing competition between the IASB and local standard-setting bodies will encourage similarly healthy competition in setting accounting standards.
Moreover, the possibility of segmentation of accounting standards is not new to the U.S.
There has been much discussion about the "Little GAAP, Big GAAP" controversy over adjusting reporting standards for clientele effects. Competition between IASB and the FASB will respond to clienteles on a global scale. In short, I agree that while there may be a problem resulting from IASB standards not being directly competitive with U.S. GAAP, there is a simple resolution of the problem-just introduce more competition!
Broader Agreement Means Weaker Standards
M9: You turned my own argument against me. But it is not that simple. Because the IASB must gain approval from a much larger constituency, the number of things they can agree on must be smaller than what the FASB agrees on. A possible result is lax standards compared to the FASB's. Lax IASB standards allow firms more opportunity to manage their earnings, making financial reports less useful to investors. One of the costs associated with reaching the political consensus necessary to get international standards adopted is that the standards must be constructed relatively broadly and less specifically. 
Uniformity of Form or Uniformity of Substance
C9:
Achieving uniformity and comparability of financial reports across firms and across time is a difficult problem in financial accounting. Contrary to popular belief, more detailed and more rigid or "uniform" standards that allow fewer options to managers do not make financial reports more comparable, or more informative. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 2 is a good example. It requires all research and development outlays to be expensed, allowing managers no discretion when accounting for such costs. As a consequence two firms that spend equal amounts on research report identical financial results, even when one's research is successful and the other's research yields no usable results. The idea that detailed rules lead to uniform and comparable results can be easily rejected on the basis of the exponential growth of the Internal Revenue Code, and the public dissatisfaction with the inequities of the tax burden and the administration of the Code.
13
When you permit firms to choose from a set of accounting alternatives, firms do not necessarily reduce the amount of information they reveal to the readers of their reports, as long as the method they choose is also disclosed in the reports. Their choice among methods reveals what they know to the discriminating reader, just as the choice of an auto insurance policy with a low deductible reveals a policyholder's private information to an insurance company (see Levine, 1996) . By choosing a low deductible policy, the policyholder reveals his/her high driving risk and high aversion to financial risk. Financial analysts continually scrutinize the choice of accounting methods by firms to assess the quality of firms and the quality of their management. Nothing generates a faster sell decision by an experienced analyst than a financial report in which management enlists all possible accounting tricks to burnish the report.
Managers cannot resort to such methods without also revealing to knowledgeable readers that their firm is in a desperate condition. By eliminating such options in favor of "tight" standards, we also close off yet another channel of communication from the firm to the investing public.
Besides, managers who wish to be in the good graces of shareholders and analysts, and have confidence in the prospects of their firm, always have the option of revealing more than the applicable standards require. Adding IASB to FASB standards will not change any of this.
International Standards Body May be Captured by Non Business Interests
M10: I want to step back to an earlier point about how the nature and extent of lobbying might be affected by competition between standard-setters. You thought that introducing competition will take the heat off a single standard-setting body and so, in principle, induce that body to be more adventurous in choosing innovative, even aggressive, standards. Contrary to your conjecture, I think competition will exacerbate, not relieve, lobbying pressures. We know how children try to play one parent against the other to get what they want. Competition between standard-setters to attract client firms will only make them more susceptible to such pressures. It is easier to take a hard line when you are the only game in town.
Moreover, I worry about the pressures that could be brought to bear on the IASB. In the U.S., some accountants complain about the excessive influence of the Financial Executives
International and the Business Roundtable in the standard-setting process. But lobbying pressure 13 Also see Uniformity in Financial Accounting (1965), and Sunder (1997, pp. 143-45) .
from nonbusiness interests could be even worse. Think of the IASB as the United Nations of accounting boards. It is a voluntary association created by accounting organizations across 114 countries. If environmental or governmental interests in enough countries dominate business interests, the IASB might be induced to issue standards unacceptable or irrelevant to business firms. International labor unions, various governmental groups, environmental and consumer groups may all try to sway IASB standards. One possible result of all this pressure is for the business community to stay away from IASB standards entirely. The conflicts among business, accounting, and other groups I mentioned could produce a deadlocked, paralyzed IASB, a paper tiger.
C10: Early in this conversation, you argued against more than one standard-setting body because the resulting competition would pose a serious challenge to the FASB, and that is undesirable. Now, you're saying that it is undesirable to have more than one standard-setting body because it wouldn't create viable competition. You can't have it both ways.
The possibility of IASB standards being co-opted by nonbusiness interests is remote.
Even if that happens, the business community will not sit and watch from the sidelines any more than they did when the FASB's standards became mandatory in the U.S. Business will have a significant voice in all standard-setting decisions. Moreover, when businesses can choose which set of standards to adopt, neither the IASB nor any other standard-setting body can afford to write standards that alienate the business community. Even if your worst fears came true, and the IASB were captured by interests hostile to business, under the proposal we are debating the business community could simply ignore those standards and carry on.
My overall argument is simple: either IASB would be a viable alternative or it wouldn't; let's experiment by giving it a chance! The costs of conducting the experiment aren't that high. The duplication of effort in evaluating competing standards is inevitable and wasteful.
On top of this, firms may incur significant implementation costs if they decide to switch between competing standards. Also, competing standard-setting groups lack the incentives to engage in due diligence when developing standards. Since the output of a standard-setting body is what economists call a public good, a competing standard-setting body can use the concepts and ideas underlying a standard for free without incurring the cost of developing it. A developer of standards has no enforceable property right to its ideas and concepts. In contrast, a monopoly standard-setting body has the appropriate incentives to do due diligence without wasteful duplication.
14 The importance of "experimenting," or taking an action that may not be the best possible given current information, in hopes of making improved future decisions based on additional information collected today, has been the subject of intense study in the statistics literature. These problems have been classically referred to as "bandit" problems. See Berry and Fristed [1985] for an overview. This literature occasionally receives attention in economics as well. See, e.g., Grossman, Kihlstrom, and Mirman [1977] for the earliest such treatment in economics.
An interesting discussion about how successful firms may be averse to innovating, and consequently lose what made them successful, may be found in Christensen [1997] .
C11: Keeping your three cost categories in mind, I agree that it is easier to estimate the costs in the first and the second categories than the third. 15 But the third category of costs is an order of magnitude higher than the other two. In a competitive environment, the standard-setters have reasons to minimize the sum of all three costs -essentially minimizing the third element. This inherent tendency of a competitive system is absent in a monopoly regime.
While your schema of costs is quite comprehensive, it is difficult in practice to provide reasonably precise estimates of any but the most trivial of these costs. Consider just one of the costs that is difficult to evaluate: the costs of obtaining "representative" standards' board 15 Accounting and management generally are plagued with instances in which decisions are based on the easily assembled or computed information, rather than information most relevant to the decision at hand. A classic example is the emphasis on the "total costs of quality," consisting of appraisal, prevention, internal failure, and external failure costs (see, e.g., Kaplan and Ittner [1988] .) While the existence of these costs cannot be denied, they
As I mentioned earlier, the costs of setting standards are difficult to quantify. See Farrell and Saloner (1985) for an early reference.
GAAP.
C12: I agree that network externalities apply to accounting standards. Without such externalities, each firm could follow its own rules and there will be little need for standards (see Sunder 1997, Ch. 11) . The critical issue is how the magnitude of network externalities of accounting standards changes with the number of conforming firms. The economics literature typically assumes that the benefit of using a common standard increases with the number of consumers, according to some functional relationship. We do not know this function. It is possible that the rate of increase in benefit drops significantly as the numbers grow, in which case the advantage of adhering to a single set of standards in a large economy is minimal.
Let's consider the following thought experiment for the network externalities associated with telephones. Suppose everyone in the U.S. has a phone, but no one in Russia does. Under this hypothetical situation, it is not clear that most U.S. residents would get much added benefit if all Russians were given phones. We should expect the incremental network externalities associated with more users to become small at some point. While network externalities may be important, we should not overstate their magnitude.
If the potential benefits from network externalities diminish rapidly with the number of firms adhering to the standards, competing standard-setters may do as well as a monopolist standard-setter. And this is true even without considering the other benefits of competition I mentioned earlier.
Your analogy with uniform sanitation code is inappropriate. First, investors do not have to know the details of GAAP, only their investment advisors do. People order and eat their meals without professional advisors at their side. Second, U.S. GAAP already permits many financial reporting alternatives, forcing investors and analysts to cope with the different choices firms make.
M13: Perhaps the biggest of the costs of accounting standards we haven't discussed yet is their effect on the risks borne by investors and the risk premium investors demand when pricing securities. Reporting standards cannot reduce the risk arising from the covariance between the market and firm returns. They can affect portrayal of the risk associated with the firm's cash flows. A monopoly standard-setter concerned with the risk borne by the shareholders of firms that adhere to its standards could attempt to minimize this latter risk premium in the aggregate.
Would competition among several standard setters do as well?
C13: I believe that competitive standard-setters would do better. If the only objective of standard-setters is to minimize the "informational" risk premium, there will be no difference in the disclosures proposed by a monopoly standard-setter and a set of competitive standardsetters. 17 But socially concerned standard-setters must also consider whether increased disclosures result in firms' disclosing proprietary information to their competitors. When such proprietary costs are taken into account, it is very difficult to determine efficient or optimal standards. As I stated above, competitive standard-setting bodies are more likely to make the right choices in such tough decision-making circumstances.
Summary
M14: I think we have put as many issues on the table as is possible in one debate, so let me summarize. I don't believe we need to fix something that is not broken. You believe in laissez faire competition, even in fields where the presence of externalities mitigates against the advantages of competition. As a practical matter, the SEC will never countenance the "choice" solution you propose. As a regulatory agency, the SEC has low tolerance for ambiguity and always champions the cause of uniformity over flexibility, even when, in your opinion, such C14: Informed by a wider debate of this kind, we could make a better decision about opening U.S. to the IASB standards. I wish we could elicit the best arguments by inviting more people to participate in this debate, even offering a prize to the person who makes the most persuasive case. But I guess to be consistent with the philosophical position you advanced throughout this debate, you prefer a debate with only one person present, whose assertions are final and binding.
See Dye [1990] .
